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The Impossible Dream:
Real International Antitrust
Diane P. Woodt
The apparent triumph of free market ideology around the
world that has followed the collapse of the Soviet empire coincides
with a period of intense strain in international trading relations.
The countries of Central and East Europe and the new republics
that have replaced the Soviet Union are attempting to put in place
the basic laws that will assure a healthy market economy,1 and
many developing countries have taken significant steps in that di-
rection. However, at the same time, the efforts of the member na-
tions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") to
assure a system of international trade under which goods and ser-
vices are produced efficiently, prices are accurate'and transparent,
and governmental distortions are minimized, have been
foundering.2
t Harold J. and Marion F. Green Professor of International Legal Studies and Associ-
ate Dean, The University of Chicago Law School. I gratefully acknowledge the support of
the Arnold and Frieda Shure Research Fund and the Russell Baker Scholars-Fund for this
Article. I am also indebted to Goranka Sumonja, without whose able research assistance this
Article could not have been completed.
1 The laws in question establish (or re-invigorate) the enforceability of contracts, the
banking system, taxation, terms of foreign investment, and a host of other subjects. See
generally Monte E. Wetzler, Chairman, Joint Ventures and Privatization in Eastern Eu-
rope (Practicing Law Institute, 1991); David E. Birenbaum and Dimitri P. Racklin, Busi-
ness Ventures in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union: the Emerging Legal Framework
for Foreign Investment (Prentice Hall Law & Business, 1990); and Eugene Theroux, chair-
man, Legal Aspects of Trade and Investment in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
1990 (Practicing Law Institute, 1990). These particular changes in business law are taking
place against a background of more profound constitutional change. See, for example, Con-
stitution Watch, 1 East European Constitutional Rev 2 (1992).
' The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 55 UNTS 194, as amended, is the basic
charter for international trade. See generally John H Jackson, World Trade and the Law of
GATT (Bobbs-Merrill, 1969); Kenneth Dam, The GATT: Law and International Economic
Organization (U of Chicago Press, 1970). The current version of the General Agreement can
be found at GATT, 4 Basic Instruments and Selected Documents ("BISD"). The most re-
cent efforts toward the liberalization of the GATT rules, known as the Uruguay Round,
were launched in a Ministerial Declaration of the Contracting Parties following a meeting in
Punta del Este, Uruguay, in September 1986. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade:
Ministerial Declaration on the Uraguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 25 ILM
1623 (1986). The Uruguay Round was originally scheduled to be completed in December
1990. When it became clear that disagreements over such diverse subjects as trade in agri-
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The same dynamics have led to another apparent paradox. On
the one hand, countries around the globe have enacted antitrust
laws (also called competition laws or antimonopoly laws) both to
symbolize their commitment to the competitive process and to pre-
vent the abusive practices which may tempt powerful firms.3 On
the other hand, efforts to obtain an international consensus on
competition law principles have thus far met with only the most
modest success, to the point that the search for either harmoniza-
tion of national competition law rules or the establishment of any
kind of supranational procedural or substantive regime seems to be
an impossible dream.4
cultural products, the rules for government subsidies, liberalization of trade in services, and
trade-related intellectual property rules could not be resolved, the negotiating parties de-
cided to extend that deadline. See, generally, John H. Jackson, Restructuring the GATT
System (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990); Judith H. Bello and Alan F. Holmer,
The Uruguay Round: Where Are We? 25 Intl Law 723, 724-26 (1991). The critical point
about the Uruguay Round for present purposes is the fact that its aspirations were all based
on well understood principles of open, free market competition; its difficulties have
stemmed from a reluctance on the part of all GATT member countries to embrace those
principles in an unqualified manner.
I See, for example, Brazilian Basic Legislation on Competition, including Law No 8002
of 14 March 1990, making provision for the repression of attempted infringements on con-
sumers' rights and Law No 8158 of 8 January 1991, setting rules to protect competition and
making other provisions (on file with the Legal Forum); Republic of Korea, Monopoly Regu-
lation and Fair Trade Act, Law No 3320 as amended (on file with the Legal Forum);
Taiwanese Fair Trade Law of February 4, 1991 (on file with the Legal Forum); Czechoslova-
kia, Act on Protection of Economic Competition (Jan 30, 1991) translated in V. Pechota, ed,
1 Central & East European Legal Materials (rel no 4); Poland, Law on Counteracting Mo-
nopolistic Practices (Feb 24, 1990) translated in Pechota, 2 Central and East European
Legal Materials (rel no 5). For a treatise including text and commentary on many competi-
tion laws, see Julian 0. von Kalinowski, ed, World Law of Competition (Matthew Bender,
1987).
' I am not the first to recall Cervantes's Don Quixote in this context. See Joel Davidow,
The Seeking of a World Competition Code: Quixotic Quest, in Oscar Schachter and Robert
Hellawell, eds, Competition in International Business 361 (Columbia U Press, 1981). As the
allusion implies, the vision of a world with a unified competition law, like the world where
chivalry would have reigned supreme, suggests something highly desirable, but ultimately
unattainable. Proponents of "managed trade" or, more generally, conscious industrial policy,
would disagree with this premise. For arguments on the need for reciprocal bilateral free
trade, rather than the unconditional GATT version, see Douglas F. Lamont, Forcing Our
Hand: America's Trade Wars in the 1980s 227 (Lexington Books, 1986). For a persuasive
argument that American industrial policy should be more self-conscious and above-board,
see Robert B. Reich, The Next American Frontier (Times Books, 1983).
In the following exploration of the reasons why a true' international antitrust regime
seems impossible, the circumstances in which each nation chooses. to limit its competition
laws will be explored in greater detail. To the extent that these reasons can and should vary
from place to place, they may suggest that the goal of international competition law is itself
problematic, as I have noted elsewhere. Nonetheless, the discussion here proceeds from the
basic premise that effective competition offers the best hope for maximum consumer wel-
fare, and that the observed limitations upon competition are explainable in large part as a
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It is perhaps easy to understand why the necessary consensus
for an international competition law has not coalesced among na-
tions with substantially different economic conditions. The
problems of the developing countries, for instance, continue to
place strains on their economic policies that have no counterpart in
the so-called western industrialized world.5 Until the overthrow of
the Communist regimes, it was difficult to imagine how those coun-
tries could ever participate in any serious internationally competi-
tive regime.' Even the Asian countries had long-standing traditions
governing business relationships that were alien to the world of
Adam Smith: witness how poorly the Antimonopoly Law that Gen-
eral MacArthur bequeathed to Japan took root there, at least for
the first four decades of its existence.7
necessary evil in a world still significantly divided along nation-state lines. For a general
discussion of the problem of monopoly in international trade, see Richard E. Caves and
Ronald W. Jones, World Trade and Payments 162-78 (Little, Brown & Co., 4th ed 1985).
1 For example, the role of foreign direct investment, the degree of supervision deemed
necessary in that area, the most effective way to address problems of income distribution
within the countries, the role government can or should play in developing infrastructure,
and optimal taxation policy all pose different questions for the developing countries. Many
of these concerns underlie the efforts of the United Nations Commission on Transnational
Corporations ("UNCTC") to develop a Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations,
since multinationals are the principal source of foreign direct investment. See UNCTC Cur-
rent Studies, The United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations (1986).
Competition law normally assumes that entrepreneurial activity will arise in the absence of
cartels or exclusionary behavior, but this assumption itself may be grounded in the Western
tradition and thus may not be easily transferrable to other cultures.
6 It was difficult enough to incorporate them, into the GATT, although many Warsaw
Pact countries eventually acceded to the General Agreement. See M.M. Kostecki, East-
West Trade and the GATT System (St. Martin's Press, 1978). The Soviet Union never
acceded, although the possibility was discussed during the late 1980s. See, for example, Ke-
vin C. Kennedy, The Accession of the Soviet Union to GATT, 21 J World Trade L 23
(1987).
7 The Japanese Antimonopoly Law is nominally quite similar to its North American
and European counterparts. See Law No 54, April 14, 1947, Relating to Prohibition of Pri-
vate Monopoly and Methods of Preserving Fair Trade (Eibun-Horei-Sha, 1978); Mitsuo
Matsushita, Introduction to Japanese Antimonopoly Law, (Yukikaku, 1st ed 1990). Over
the years, enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law has been minimal. See Matsushita, Japa-
nese Antimonopoly Law; Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Current Developments in Japanese Com-
petition Law: Antimonopoly Act Enforcement Guidelines Resulting from the Structural
Impediments Initiative, 60 Antitrust L J 279 (1991). As Lipsky describes, in 1989, the
United States and Japan undertook a round of discussions dubbed the "Structural Impedi-
ments Initiative," which were designed to explore fundamental reasons behind the persis-
tent trade deficit that the United States was experiencing with Japan. The lack of Japanese
competition law enforcement was one topic of discussion. The Joint Report issued after the
discussions included a commitment on the part of the Japanese to strengthen their competi-
tion law enforcement activities, pursuant to which new enforcement guidelines have been
issued and new activities have been undertaken. See Joint Comments on the Japan Fair
Trade Commission Antimonopoly Act Enforcement Guidelines, 60 Antitrust L J 291, 327
(1991); Japan: Expanded Role is Expected for Antitrust Enforcement Officials, 9 Intl
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Assuming the apparent futility of global agreement on compe-
tition law, one is still left with the question why a closer and more
formal convergence between similar countries has not yet occurred.
Canada and the United States have both had competition laws
since the late nineteenth century;8 the European Community
("EC") made competition law an essential part of the Treaty of
Rome from its outset in 1958.' Since the Second World War,
nearly all EC Member States have enacted national competition
laws.10 At a broad level of generality, the content of these laws does
not differ markedly from their U.S. or Canadian counterparts, al-
though this should not mask the fact that the role of competition
in the economic policy of the EC Member States and its relation-
ship to other economic policies often diverge from the American
models.
It is worth exploring why and to what extent a more formal
international competition regime among this group of economically
advanced and philosophically compatible countries might be desir-
able, and what has prevented one from being developed. The an-
swer to the first question, given the increasing dominance of mul-
tinational business activity in every sector of economic life, seems
clear: effective regulation of the competitive process must somehow
take place at the same level where the business activity itself is
pursued, that is, the international level. The answer to the second
question is more difficult. To a significant degree, the impediments
to greater convergence among the principal western economies
have been procedural. Beyond that, the failure to reach an interna-
tional antitrust code is due to the rather considerable gap that lies
between aspiration and reality, or between articulated principle
and practical application. Through a combination of administra-
tive discretion and an ability to carve out explicit exceptions to
competition laws, nations have, to greater or lesser degrees, subor-
dinated free market principles to other elements of national self-
interest. Given these constraints, this Article concludes by outlin-
Trade Rptr (BNA) 244 (Feb 2, 1992); Japan: Hills Urges Japan to Step Up Antitrust En-
forcement and Increase Maximum Fines, Intl Trade Daily (BNA) 12 (April 29, 1992).
' [Canada] Combines Investigation Act, R S, c 314. See Lloyd G. Reynolds, The Con-
trol of Competition in Canada (Harvard U Press, 1940). In the U.S., antitrust law at the
federal level has existed since 1890. See the Sherman Act, 15 USC §§ 1-7 (1988).
' See Treaty Est the Eur Eco Comm, Arts 85-94. The earlier European Coal and Steel
Treaty of July 20, 1952, also contained competition law provisions at Arts 65-66.
" For a listing and summary of major national competition laws, see Thomas H. Reyn-
olds and Arturo A. Flores, Foreign Law: Current Sources of Codes and Basic Legislation in
Jurisdictions of the World (AALL Publ Series no 33, Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1991).
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ing a few ways in which the dream of an international competition
regime might become somewhat less impossible.
I. EFFORTS TO DEVELOP INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW
A. Universal Rules within the U.N. System
1. The International Trade Organization and the Havana
Charter.
Efforts to develop a set of competition law principles with
broad international application began at a time when U.S. anti-
trust law itself had just reached the end of its formative years,"
even before the present United Nations was formed. 12 These initia-
tives went nowhere, partly for the general reasons that eventually
caused the failure of the League of Nations, and partly because
many of the major European trading nations simply disagreed with
the proposition that cartels, were bad.'3
After the Second World War, however, attitudes toward inter-
national economic policy changed. The Bretton Woods Conference
led to the formation of the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank." The GATT was born in the first round of multilat-
eral negotiations; 5 and a draft charter for an International Trade
"' For example, the 1914 Clayton Act, 38 Stat 730, 15 USC §§ 12-27, was still a rela-
tively recent addition to the U.S. antitrust arsenal. The Federal Trade Commission, created
in the FTC Act, 38 Stat 717 (1914), 15 USC §§ 41-58 (as amended), was also in its infancy.
Furthermore, the severity of the Sherman Act prohibitions was still quite an open question,
as was illustrated by the need for the Supreme Court in 1927 to reaffirm the automatic
illegality of horizontal price-fixing in United States v Trenton Potteries Co., 273 US 392
(1927), after the decision in Standard Oil Co. v United States, 221 US 1 (1911), had an-
nounced the vague and easily manipulated rule of reason.
2 For a description of the relatively minor efforts undertaken by the League of Na-
tions, see Corwin D. Edwards, Control of Cartels and Monopolies: An International Com-
parison 227-28 (Oceana Publications, 1967). See also William Oualid, The Social Effects of
International Industrial Agreements, CECP 94 (1926) (prepared for the World Economic
Conference sponsored by the League of Nations), discussed in M. Sornarajah, Towards an
International Antitrust Law, 22 Indian J of Intl L 1, 6 (1982). Oualid's proposals were
rejected by the Industrial Committee of the conference.
" Not very many countries had cartel laws during this era, and the-onset of the Depres-
sion in the 1930s led many to believe that cartels were positively useful. Edwards, Control of
Cartels at 3-6, 228 n 15 (cited in note 12).
" See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 60 Stat 1401, TIAS
No 1501, 2 UNTS 39 (1947) (original version), reprinted as amended in Stephen Zamora
and Ronald A. Brand, eds, 1 Basic Documents of International Economic Law 321 (1990);
Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (The
World Bank), TIAS No 1507, 2 UNTS 134, reprinted as amended in Zamora & Brand, 1
Basic Documents at 427.
6 See Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT (cited in note 2); Clair Wilcox, A
Charter for World Trade 46-49 (MacMillan, 1949).
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Organization ("ITO") was prepared.16 Then, as now, the world
community saw economic reforms as closely linked to broader is-
sues of international harmony. Although it would be an exaggera-
tion to say that competition law itself played a central role, the
postwar economic institutions represented the triumph of the
viewpoint that the international trading system should be purged
of nationalistic distortions and left free to grow according to the
theory of comparative advantage. 17
Those broader aspirations led the drafters of the ITO to in-
clude chapters on everything that might conceivably distort the
optimal world trading system. The Charter, also known as the Ha-
vana Charter, therefore included not only the rules on tariffs and
trade (which the General Agreement had already accomplished,
and which would have been folded into the broader organization),
but also rules on international investment, competition, and dis-
pute resolution, among others. 8 The importance of the competi-
tion rules was well recognized at the time. Clair Wilcox,. one of the
principal architects of the ITO, wrote that:
The effort to expand trade by reducing tariffs and elimi-
nating quotas might well be defeated if no action were
taken to prevent the erection of private tariff and quota
systems by international cartels. The necessary action
might either be taken through international agreement or
left to the initiative of individual states. But unilateral
action, even when taken by a government as powerful as
that of the United States, has its limitations. It cannot
protect domestic consumers against the consequences of
16 The drafters expected that the GATT would be administered under the ITO. See
Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade at 199-200 (cited in note 15); William Adams Brown,
Jr., The Provisions of the GATT and Its Relationship to the Charter, in his The United
States and the Restoration of World Trade 235 (Brookings Institute, 1950).
"7 This consensus was not reached easily, as Clair Wilcox's account of the development
of the International Trade Organization Charter (also known as the Havana Charter) makes
clear. See Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade (cited in note 15). On the economic case for
international trade, see generally Bharat R. Hazari, International Trade: Theoretical Issues
(NYU Press, 1986). See also Corwin D. Edwards, Theodore J. Kreps, Ben W. Lewis, Fritz
Machlup, and Robert P. Terrill, A Cartel Policy for the United Nations (Columbia U Press,
1945) (reviewing the cartel problem, discussing the inadequacies of unilateral action with
respect to international cartels, and arguing for an international policy against them).
" The text of the Havana Charter is reproduced in its entirety in Wilcox, A Charter for
World Trade at 227-327 (cited in note 15). The Department of State version, Havana Char-
ter for an International Trade Organization, Pub 3206, Commercial Policy Series 114, re-
leased September 1948, is reprinted in Julius J. Marke and Najeeb Samie, eds, 1 Anti-Trust
and Restrictive Business Practices: International, Regional & National Regulation § 5 D
(Oceana Publications, 1982).
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cartel agreements in which domestic producers do not
participate. It cannot obtain evidence concerning agree-
ments made and administered abroad, even where do-
mestic producers do participate. And if it does succeed in
breaking up a cartel that is sponsored or supported by
other governments, it may induce those governments, in
one way or another, to retaliate. If action against restric-
tive business practices in international trade is to be ef-
fective, it must be taken by many states in accordance
with a common understanding as to policy. If the tariff
and quota provisions of the [ITO] Charter were not to be
evaded, it was therefore important that such an under-
standing be obtained.19
Another contemporary study of the Charter that had been pre-
pared for the purpose of advising the U.S. Congress on the ratifica-
tion question concluded that international cartel provisions were
clearly desirable.2" The study explained this conclusion in language
reminiscent of the justifications for including competition law pro-
visions in the Treaty of Rome:
International cartel agreements, by limiting competition,
fixing prices, and curtailing trade, can nullify the effects
of reductions in governmental barriers to trade. Under
the Charter, each member is required to take all possible
steps to assure that enterprises in its jurisdiction do not
engage in restrictive business practices affecting interna-
tional trade which have harmful effects on production or
trade and interfere with the realization of any of the
objectives of the Charter. A procedure is established
under which the ITO may receive complaints, conduct in-
vestigations, and make findings. Since many of the coun-
tries which finally accepted these provisions have no
traditional allegiance to the principle of competition, this
section of the Charter represents an important conces-
sion to the American point of view.2"
19 Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade at 105 (cited in note 15).
2 Committee for Economic Development, The International Trade Organization and
the Reconstruction of World Trade 22 (1949).
" Id at 23. Commentators on the Treaty of Rome have often stressed the importance of
the competition rules in preventing the re-establishment of state-created barriers to trade
within the Common Market. See, for example, Christopher Bellamy and Graham D. Child,
Common Market Law of Competition 14-18 (Sweet & Maxwell, 3d ed 1987); David A. 0.
Edward and Robert C. Lane, European Community Law-An Introduction 23 (But-
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In the end, however, Congress rejected the ITO, not the least be-
cause of the antitrust objections. This was somewhat awkward,
since the Americans were, at the time, the greatest publicists for
antitrust on the face of the globe, and it seemed peculiar for them
to abandon an instrument that promised international coordina-
tion of competition rules. The principal obstacles, however, actu-
ally reflected that U.S. position: Congress was not ready to cede
any antitrust jurisdiction to the international mechanisms estab-
lished by the Charter, and furthermore, it found the language on
restrictive business practices to be too weak, as compared with the
prevailing U.S. standards on these matters.22 Half a loaf was not,
under the circumstances, better than no loaf at all.
2. The Economic and Social Council Code.
After the Havana Charter failed, the Economic, and Social
Council ("ECOSOC") of the United Nations undertook a more
targeted study of anticompetitive practices.23 That effort resulted
in a new set of draft articles of agreement on restrictive business
practices. The draft articles were released for public discussion in
1953.24 The draft was based in large part on Chapter V of the
failed ITO, with most differences due to the fact that the rest of
the ITO organization on which Chapter V had depended no longer
existed. It included, with one exception relating to technology
agreements, the same list of restrictive practices as the Havana
Charter had adopted. 5 Institutional machinery, as before, proved
problematic. The ECOSOC decided to circulate the Committee's
terworths, 1991); D.G. Goyder, EC Competition Law 72, 358 (Clarendon Press, 1988); Len-
nart Ritter, Francis Rawlinson, and W. David Braun, EC Competition Law-A Practi-
tioner's Guide 10-13 (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1991); Sir Leon Brittan,
Competition Law: Its Importance to the European Community and to International Trade
2-3, Speech at the University of Chicago Law School, April 24, 1992 (text on file with the
Legal Forum).
", William Diebold, Jr.; The End of the ITO (Essays in International Finance No 16,
Princeton U, 1952).
" The study was undertaken pursuant to Economic and Social Council resolution 375
(XIII) of 13 Sept 1951, reprinted in Marke & Samie, 1 Anti-Trust and Restrictive Business
Practices § 5 D 2 at 29 (cited in note 18).
" Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Restrictive Business Practices to the Economic
and Social Council, E/2380, E/AC.37/3 (Mar 30, 1953), reprinted in Marke & Samie, 1 Anti-
Trust and Restrictive Business Practices § 5 D 2 at 29 (cited in note 18).
" Namely, price-fixing, exclusion of enterprises from markets, market divisions, dis-
criminatory practices, production limitations, preventing the development of technologies
by means of agreement, withholding the application of technologies in a way that monopo-
lized a field, extending patent or other industrial property rights beyond their lawful scope,
and any other practice added to the list by a two-thirds vote of the organization. Annex II
to the Ad Hoc Committee's Report, Art 1, 3, reprinted in Marke & Samie, 1 Antitrust and
[1992:
IMPOSSIBLE DREAM
report for comment and to resume discussion in 1955. However,
once again, the United States, in the form of the following state-
ment from the Eisenhower Administration, dealt the death blow to
the effort:
[D]ifferences which presently exist in national policies
and practices . . . are of such magnitude that the pro-
posed international agreement would be neither satisfac-
tory nor effective in accomplishing its purpose ....
[P]resent emphasis should be given not to international
organizational machinery but rather to the more funda-
mental need of further developing effective national pro-
grams to deal with restrictive business practices, and of
achieving a greater degree of comparability in the policies
and practices of all nations in their approach to the
subject.26
With the collapse of this new effort, the more ambitious multilat-
eral efforts ceased for a number of years. On a more modest plane,
the GATT adopted a resolution in 1960 recommending that the
Contracting Parties consult with one another on the issue of re-
strictive business practices.2 7 However, the next major effort came
at the initiative of the developing countries.
3. The UNCTAD Restrictive Business Practices Guidelines.
In 1973, as part of a broader program designed to establish a
New International Economic Order, the developing countries de-
cided to pursue the negotiation of a multilateral code on restrictive
business practices.28 Negotiations began within the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD") on the sub-
ject of restrictive business practices.2 9 In 1980, those efforts came
Restrictive Business Practices § 5 D 2 at 29 (cited in note 18). Compare Havana Charter,
Art 46, 3, reprinted in id § 5 D 1 at 1, 11-12.
"e Economic & Social Council, Restrictive Business Practices, Comments of Govern-
ments, E/2612, Add 2, pp 4-5 (Apr 4, 1955), quoted in Edwards, Control of Cartels and
Monopolies at 235 (cited in note 12). For a trenchant criticism of the Administration's posi-
tion, by one of the participants in the ECOSOC ad hoc committee, see Sigmund Timberg,
Restrictive Business Practices as an Appropriate Subject for United Nations Action, 1
Antitrust Bull 409 (1955).
27 GATT resolution, BISD 28 (9th Supp, 1961).
28 See UNCTAD, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business
Practices in Relation-to the Trade and Development of Developing Countries, UN Doc
TD/B/C.2/119/Rev 1 (1974). On the link with the New International Economic Order pro-
gram, see Sornarajah, 22 Indian J of Intl L at 15 (cited in note 12).
1 On the restrictive practices addressed, see generally Sigmund Timberg, Restrictive
Business Practices in the International Transfer and Diffusion of Technology, in Shachter
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to a successful conclusion, when the U.N. General Assembly
adopted the clumsily named "Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equita-
ble Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business
Practices."' o
For present purposes, only a few points about the Restrictive
Business Practices Code ("the Code"), as it is more commonly
called, are important. First, at the insistence of the developed
countries, the Code is voluntary."1 Second, at the insistence of the
developing countries, the Code contains numerous hortatory provi-
sions calling for special attention, or special concern, for the
problems of the developing countries.32 Finally, the Code's sub-
stantive provisions (contained in Section D) follow the general pat-
tern of condemning collusive anticompetitive actions and individ-
ual firm abuses of dominant positions. The principles and rules for
enterprises detailed in Section D of the Code are generally consis-
tent with western concepts of anticompetitive practices. With re-
spect to collective actions, the list includes price-fixing, collusive
tendering, market or customer allocations, sales or production quo-
tas, and various kinds of concerted refusals to deal. 3 With respect
to single firm action, the Code includes various kinds of conduct to
the extent that they may create an abuse of a dominant position,
such as predatory behavior, discriminatory commercial terms, an-
ticompetitive mergers, and some practices specifically relating to
& Hellawell, Competition in Intl Business at 84 (cited in note 4). See also the U.N. Centre
on Transnational Corporations work on a general Code of Conduct for Transnational Corpo-
rations, described in The United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations,
United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations ST/CTC/SER.A/4, at 26-27 (UNCTC
Current Studies, 1986) (discussing the legal nature of the Code, which has yet to be defi-
nitely settled in the negotiations).
10 See UN Doc TD/RBP/CONF 10/Rev 1 (1980), endorsed by G A Res 63, UN Doc A/
RES/35/63 (1980).
" For example, the Preamble specifically states that the Conference "hereby agrees on
the following Set of Principles and Rules for the control of restrictive business practices,
which take the form of recommendations." The verb form "should" is used throughout the
text, rather than the mandatory "shall." The significance of the choice of a voluntary instru-
ment is discussed in Joel Davidow and Lisa Chiles, The United States andthe Issue of the
Binding or Voluntary Nature of International Codes of Conduct Regarding Restrictive
Business Practices, 72 Am J Intl L 247 (1978). See also Arghyrios A. Fattouros, The UN
Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations: A Critical Discussion of the First Draft-
ing Phase, in Norbert Horn, ed, Legal Problems of Codes of Conduct for Multinational
Enterprises 103-125 (Kluwer B.V., 1980) (uncertainty about the legal nature of the Code);
Hans W. Baade, The Legal Effects of Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, in
Horn, ed, Legal Problems of Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises at 3-38 (legal
nature of codes of conduct for Multinational Enterprises in general).
32 See, for example, Objective 4, § A; Equitable Principle 3, § C.
11 See Restrictive Business Practices Code, § D.3.
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imports and exports.3 4 However, because the Code is nonbinding,
most countries agreed that it did not originally constitute a source
of international antitrust law, nor has it evolved into such a
source.
3 5
4. Current Discussion on Universal Competition
Agreements.
Recently, a group of lawyers from the American Bar Associa-
tion's Antitrust Section completed a comprehensive study of inter-
national antitrust enforcement, in which they considered once
again the desirability of pursuing a world-wide antitrust code. s6
They concluded that such a code was not a worthwhile goal on four
grounds: (1) the near impossibility of meaningful agreement on
standards, (2) the inadvisability of negotiating away critical condi-
tions, (3) the benefits of nations' freedom to differ (due to the need
from time to time to pursue non-efficiency goals), and (4) the
problems of enforcement.37 Even a narrow code limited to hard-
core anti-cartel provisions seemed not to be worth the costs of va-
rious political quid pro quo measures the Committee foresaw.38
The Committee concluded instead that efforts to harmonize na-
tional laws in key areas (such as cartel prohibitions, elimination of
exemptions for export cartels, and procedural harmonization for
merger enforcement) were more promising.39 These conclusions are
difficult to dispute, particularly in light of the lack of success
within the Uruguay Round toward significantly liberalizing other
difficult areas of multilateral economic activity, such as investment
activities, trade in services, and agricultural trade.40 The time for
" See id at § D.4.
" Although the point is not free from dispute, most international scholars agree that
U.N. General Assembly resolutions do not, of their own force, constitute a source of interna-
tional law. See generally Baade, Legal Effects at 5 (cited in note 31); Richard A. Falk, On
the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly, 60 Am J Intl L 782, 783-85
(1966). However, it is always possible that such a resolution may be evidence of an emerging
consensus among nations on customary international law. One might argue that the Code
contributes to the development of an international consensus against cartels and abuses of
dominant positions, but concrete implementation of such a rule has taken place only within
the context of domestic law.
" See American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, Report of the Special Com-
mittee on International Antitrust ch 11 (Sept 1, 1991) ("1991 Special Committee Report").
"7 Id, vol 1 at 289-90.
38 Id at 292-93.
19 Id at 294.
,o To be sure, the problems with agricultural subsidies are different from those relating,
for example, to trade in services; nevertheless, the desire to retain national sovereignty is a
common thread running through all the difficulties.
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universal competition law agreements, as well as universal agree-
ments on a variety of other sensitive matters of economic policy,
apparently has not yet arrived.
B. Targeted Agreements and Rules
At the same time that global efforts were not producing satis-
factory results, consensus on competition policy was growing
among countries with similar forms of government, similar levels of
development, and similar kinds of economies (that is, market-
based, with varying degrees of government participation for social
purposes). These occurred in three contrasting ways, each of which
bears on the type of future effort that may succeed. The first ex-
ample can be found in the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development ("OECD") Guidelines for Multinational Enter-
prises, adopted in 1976 and revised several times since then-a
voluntary set of rules, with some institutional oversight, adopted
by the western developed democracies.4' The second example is
the EC itself: a commitment by the Member States to create a sin-
gle internal market, with a supranational body of competition law,
both substantive and procedural, enforced by a powerful suprana-
tional institution. Finally, one finds the bilateral antitrust coopera-
tion agreements, which occupy an intermediate position between
the first two examples: they provide more than the hortatory
OECD Guidelines but far less than the EC has achieved.
1. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development.
The OECD's members are the twenty-four major industrial-
ized nations of the world.42 In 1976, the OECD adopted a broad set
of Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, covering disclosure of
information, competition, taxation, employment and industrial re-
41 Earlier, in 1967, the Council of the OECD had adopted a Recommendation concern-
ing Co-Operation between Member Countries on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting
International Trade. OECD Council Rec, Doc C(67)53 (Oct 5, 1967). As the name suggests,
however, that recommendation dealt with voluntary intergovernmental cooperation rather
than specific competition standards. The Council also passed a Recommendation Concern-
ing a Consultation and Conciliation Procedure on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting
International Trade on December 20, 1973, reprinted in 19 Antitrust Bull 283 (1974), OECD
doc C[73199[Final].
42 The members are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zea-
land, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.
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lations, and science and technology.4" The competition guidelines
recommend that, "while conforming to the official competition
rules and established policies of the countries in which they oper-
ate," enterprises should refrain from actions that would abuse a
dominant position (giving the examples of anticompetitive acquisi-
tions, predatory behavior, unreasonable refusals to deal, abuse of
industrial property rights, and discriminatory pricing), allow pur-
chasers reasonable freedom to resell and export, refrain from par-
ticipating in cartels, and cooperate with local authorities." The
Guidelines assign oversight responsibility to the OECD's Commit-
tee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises
("CIME").
The OECD has served successfully as a forum for the ex-
change of information among the competition authorities of its
member nations, and it has helped to facilitate a great deal of vol-
untary cooperation.45 In this sense, it has undoubtedly moved the
cause of international consensus on competition rules forward and
has made possible better coordination of national policies among
its members. The fruits of this process are evident in the bilateral
agreements discussed below. It would be wholly inaccurate, how-
ever, to say that the OECD Guidelines created any sort of binding
international antitrust rules: the Guidelines were never intended to
carry such force, and it is clear that the member states would
never have agreed to them if they had been.
"' The Guidelines appear as an Annex to the Declaration by the Governments of the
OECD Member Countries and Decisions of the OECD Council on Guidelines for Multina-
tional Enterprises, National Treatment, International Investment Incentives and Disincen-
tives, and Consultation Procedures, in the Declaration on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises, OECD Doc C(76) 99 (Final) (June 21, 1976), reprinted in 15 ILM
967, 969 (1976) ("Guidelines"). For a short commentary, see Daniel J. Plaine, The OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 11 Intl Lawyer 339 (1977).
" OECD, Guidelines, section on Competition (cited in note 43).
" The OECD has continued to work in the area of restrictive business practices. It
passed a Council Recommendation Concerning Action Against Restrictive Business Prac-
tices Affecting International Trade Including Those Involving Multinational Enterprises,
OECD Doc C(78)133 (Final) (Aug 9, 1978), calling on member states to adopt legislation
that effectively prohibited or controlled abuses of dominant positions or cartels, and to co-
operate effectively in enforcement practices. See also, Council Recommendation Concerning
Co-Operation Between Member Countries on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting Inter-
national Trade, OECD Doc C(79)154 (Final) (Oct 5, 1979), focusing on notifications, ex-
changes of information, consultations, and coordination of action; and a revision of the 1979
Recommendation passed in 1986, OECD Doc C(86)44 (Final) (June 5, 1986).
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2. The European Economic Community.
The European Economic Community, or the EC as it has be-
come, stands as the counter-example to everything discussed so
far. It represents the one instance where a group of nations have
successfully implemented an agreement to create a supranational
competition law regime, which takes precedence over national law
in cases of conflict.46 The content of that law is familiar to any
American antitrust lawyer. Article 85(1) prohibits anticompetitive
agreements between undertakings, such as price-fixing, limitations
on production, divisions of markets, and tying arrangements, in a
manner reminiscent of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.47 Article 86,
which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position, reaches the same
kind of practices as one would condemn under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.48 The Merger Regulation of December 1990 provides
a review mechanism for concentrative transactions that have a
"Community dimension," and it permits the Commission to forbid
any merger that might create or strengthen a dominant position
within the Common Market. ' Though important differences also
exist between Community competition law and its U.S. counter-
part,"° the point here is simply that one is not comparing apples
46 EEC, Arts 85, 86. See generally Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64, Grundig & Consten v
Commission, 1966 ECR 299, 1966 CMLR 418; Case 6/64, Costa v Ente Nazionale Per
L'Energia Elettrica (ENEL), 1964 ECR 585, 1964 CMLR 425; Case 45/85, Verband der
Sachversicherer v Commission, 1987 ECR 405, 1988:4 CMLR 264. In the competition area
particularly, see Case 14/68, Wilhelm v Bundeskartellamt, 1969 ECR 1, 1969 CMLR 100;
Case 53/69, Sandoz v Commission ("Dyestuffs"), 1972 ECR 845.
See also Ritter, Rawlinson & Braun, Practitioner's Guide at 36-41 (cited in note 21);
Edward & Lane, European Community Law at 32 (cited in note 21); and Jean-Fran ois
Verstrynge, The Relationship Between National and Community Antitrust Law, 3 Nw J
Intl L & Bus 358, 370-71, 373-376 (1981). Compare Kurt Markert, Some Legal and Admin-
istrative Problems of the Co-Existence of Community and National Competition Law in
the EC, 11 Common Mkt L Rev 92-99 (1974).
" Goyder, EC Competition Law at 12 (cited in note 21); Ritter, Rawlinson, & Braun,
Practitioner's Guide at 59 n 13 (cited in note 21); Edward & Lane, European Community
Law at 68 (cited in note 21).
" Goyder, EC Competition Law at 12 (cited in note 21); Edward & Lane, European
Community Law at 68 (cited in note 21).
49 Merger Regulation, Council Reg 4064/89, 1990 OJ L257:14 (corrected version at 1989
OJ L395:1). Ritter, Rawlinson, & Braun, Practitioner's Guide at 339-41, 353-54, 357-59
(cited in note 21). For a discussion of early experience under the Merger Regulation, see id
at 437-51; Michael J. Reynolds, The First Year of Enforcement Under the EC Merger Reg-
ulation: A Private View, in Barry Hawk, ed, Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate
Law Institute: EC and U.S. Competition Law and Policy 649 (Transnational Juris, 1992).
" For example, in Article 85(1)(d) and in Article 86(c), the Treaty specifically con-
demns discriminatory practices in a manner that goes well beyond the U.S. Robinson-Pat-
man Act, Clayton Act § 2(a), 15 USC § 12 (1988). Article 86 begins its list of abusive prac-
tices with "unfair purchase or selling prices," which is not illegal in itself in the United
States. The substantive standards for assessing mergers appear at the present time to be
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and oranges when one looks at EC competition law and U.S. law;
rather, it is more like comparing Delicious and Macintosh.
The story of the Community's success in creating its body of
supranational competition law rests primarily on the central role of
competition law in the broader process of market integration un-
dertaken by the Member States. Case after case from the Euro-
pean Court of Justice ("ECJ") reiterates the importance of Article
3(f) of the Treaty, which lists as one of the central goals of the
Treaty the "institution of a system ensuring that competition in
the common market is not distorted. ' 51 The competition rules of
Articles 85 and 86 have direct effect in the Member States, which
means that they apply among individuals, and between individuals
and the governments of the Member States, without any need for
further national legislation.2 The political commitment the Mem-
ber States made when they decided to join the Community there-
fore included a political commitment to unified competition rules.
The close relationship between the degree of unification im-
plied by Community membership and competition law is well illus-
trated by the difficulties that arose over the new European Eco-
nomic Area ("EEA") that was designed to bring together the EC
countries and the European Free Trade Area ("EFTA") countries
in a way that did not involve full Community membership for the
latter. After nearly two decades of bilateral free trade agreements
between the Community and the EFTA countries,53 the two re-
gions agreed on October 21, 1991, to create a European Economic
more permissive than their U.S. counterparts, although it is admittedly too early to come to
firm conclusions. See generally about EC merger law, Barry Hawk, ed, Annual Proceedings
of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute: International Mergers and Joint Ventures
(Transnational Juris, 1991).
" EEC, Art 3(f). See, for example, Case 6/72, Continental Can v Commission, 1973
ECR 215, 243-45, 1973 CMLR 199, 223-25; Case 85/76, Hofmann-La Roche v Commission,
1979 ECR 461, 520, 1979:3 CMLR 211, 274; Case 322/81, Michelin v Commission, 1983 ECR
3461, 3503, 1985:1 CMLR 282, 321.
2 See Case 26/62, N. V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en
Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, ("van'Gend en Loos"), 1963 ECR 1, 12,
1963 CMLR 105, 130-131. See also Ritter, Rawlinson, & Braun, Practitioner's Guide at 707-
90 (cited in note 21); Goyder, EC Competition Law at 297, 354, 356 (cited in note 21).
6" There are seven free trade agreements, between the EC on the one side, and respec-
tively Austria, Switzerland, Portugal, Sweden, Iceland, Norway, and Finland, on the other
side. See Agreements between the European Community and: 1) Austria, 1972 OJ L300:2
(effective Jan 1, 1973); 2) Finland, 1973 OJ L328:2 (effective Jan 1, 1974); 3) Iceland, 1972
OJ L301:2 (effective Apr 1, 1973); 4) Norway, 1973 OJ L171:2 (effective Jul 1, 1973); 5)
Portugal, 1972 OJ L301:165 (effective Jan 1, 1973); 6) Sweden, 1972 OJ L300:97 (effective
Jan 1, 1973); and 7) Switzerland, 1972 OJ L300:189 (effective Jan 1, 1973). See also Neville
March Hunnings, Enforceability of the EC-EFTA Free Trade Agreements, 2 Eur L Rev
163, 164 (1977); Jean-Francois Bellis, The Interpretation of the Free Trade Agreements
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Area that would go beyond the bilaterals in a number of important
respects, while falling short of conferring full EC membership on
the EFTA countries.5' In particular, the EEA agreement went sig-
nificantly further than the free trade agreements had gone toward
creating a single, harmonized competition regime for all of Eu-
rope.5 Substantively, the agreement represents the wholesale
adoption of EC competition law as it now stands-that is, the ac-
quis communautaire-by the entire EEA: the rules dealing with
cartels, the prohibitions of abuses of dominant positions, the rules
governing state monopolies and enterprises with special or exclu-
sive rights, and the control of state aids.56 Procedurally and insti-
tutionally, however, this goal proved more difficult to achieve than
the negotiators had expected.
On December 16, 1991, the ECJ ruled that the EEA was in-
compatible with the Treaty of Rome, because it undermined the
legal independence of the court and failed to guarantee consistency
of legal rules across the entire EC.57 In particular, competition
cases would have gone to a new hybrid tribunal composed of
judges from the ECJ and from the EFTA authority, which was un-
acceptable to the ECJ. Back at the negotiation table, the parties
were able to reach final agreement in February 1992 only by stipu-
lating that, in the area of competition law, the ECJ would be solely
responsible for all cases unless they concerned only EFTA-based
entities within EFTA itself. 8 In other words, harmonization of
competition law and competition institutions was possible only be-
cause one group of countries was willing politically to accept the
other group's system.
The lesson from the EC is thus that an international antitrust
law among a small group of countries that previously had diverse
laws, but that are committed to wide-ranging economic integration,
Between the EFTA Countries and the European Community, 23-25 Swiss Review of Intl
Competition L 21 (1985).
", See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Antitrust Issues in an International Dimension, 1992
U Chi Legal F 241, 248-5i.
" The earlier free trade agreements had provided that cartels and concerted practices
and abuses of dominant positions, to the extent that they might affect trade between the
Community and the other signatory, were incompatible with the proper functioning of the
Agreements. See Art 23 (in each treaty). The competition provisions of the free trade agree-
ments are discussed in Ernst-Joachim Mestmicker, Providing Fair Conditions of Competi-
tion Under the Free Trade Agreements of the European Economic Community, 3 Nw J
Intl L & Bus 296 (1981).
" See Ehlermann, 1992 U Chi Legal F at 249-51 (cited in note 54).
" See 8 Intl Trade Rptr (BNA) 1834 (Dec 18, 1991).
" See EC Foreign Ministers Agree to Flexibility on Legal Jurisdiction in EEA Negoti-
ations, Intl Trade Daily (BNA) (Feb 6, 1992).
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can be achieved and, indeed, has been achieved. The lesson from
the EEA is less encouraging, if it means that international anti-
trust rules require either complete economic integration or full-
blown acceptance of one system or the other. The limited nature of
the bilateral agreements that the United States has negotiated
with countries that individually have strong internal competition
laws stands in sharp contrast to these European experiences. As
such, the bilaterals perhaps illustrate the pessimistic notion that
competition law cannot be harmonized outside the context of more
ambitious agreements. On the other hand, they may show only
that serious thinking about intermediate solutions is still in its
infancy.
3. Bilateral cooperation agreements.
The earliest bilateral cooperation agreements concerning com-
petition in the United States were contained within broader com-
mercial treaties of "friendship, commerce, and navigation." For ex-
ample, the 1960 Convention of Establishment between the United
States and France provides, in Article XI, that
Each High Contracting Party will take the measures it
deems appropriate with a view to preventing commercial
practices or arrangements, whether effected by one or
more private or public commercial enterprises, which re-
strain competition, limit access to markets or foster mo-
nopolistic control, whenever such practices or arrange-
ments have or might have harmful effects on trade
between the two countries. 59
Article XVIII of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Naviga-
tion between the United States and Japan includes similar lan-
guage, as well as a commitment to consult when difficulties arise,60
as do many of the other treaties. 1 In light of the unfortunate his-
tory of diplomatic tensions due to extraterritorial antitrust en-
'o Convention of Establishment between the United States of America and France,
TIAS 4625, 11 UST 2398, 2413 (entered into force Dec '21, 1960).
60 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of
America and Japan, TIAS 2863, 4 UST 2063, 2077 (entered into force Oct 30, 1953).
61 See, for example, Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the
United States of America and the Kingdom of Greece, Art XIV, TIAS 3057, 5 UST 1829,
1861 (entered into force Oct 13, 1954); Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
between the United States of America and Israel, Art XVIII, TIAS 2948, 5 UST 550, 569
(entered into force Apr 3, 1954); Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between
the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, Art XVIII, TIAS 3947, 8 UST
2217, 2230 (entered into force Nov 7, 1957).
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forcement efforts that has characterized most of the postwar pe-
riod, it is fair to conclude that these treaties did little to further
bilateral antitrust cooperation.
Later, more specific antitrust cooperation agreements were ne-
gotiated, including arrangements with Germany, 2 Australia,"3 and
Canada.6 These agreements all followed the model suggested by
the 1967 OECD Recommendation, in that they included agree-
ments to assist one another, both in antitrust investigations (to the
extent compatible with domestic law) and in gathering information
within the other's jurisdiction, and to respect confidentiality re-
strictions. Both the Australian and Canadian agreements empha-
size the need to reduce the conflicts that had arisen over enforce-
ment actions affecting conduct or parties outside the United
States. 5 Nothing in any of these bilaterals was designed to move
the signatories' substantive policies closer together, or to create a
harmonized procedural regime for multinationals. Their goals were
more modest: conflict management (if not total avoidance), cooper-
ation in enforcement within the limits of each country's enforce-
ment powers and confidentiality laws, and the greater understand-
ing that can come from regular consultations.
01 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Gov-
ernment of the Federal Republic of Germany Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding
Restrictive Business Practices, TIAS 8291, 27 UST 1956 (entered into force Sept 11, 1976).
See also the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of
America and the Federal Republic of Germany, TIAS 3593, 7 UST 1839 (entered into force
July 14, 1956).
63 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Gov-
ernment of Australia Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1981, repro-
duced in 21 ILM 702 (1982).
04 Memorandum of Understanding as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation
with Respect to the Application of National Antitrust Laws, 23 ILM 275 (1984). There were
several earlier agreements with Canada. See Comment, The Canada-United States Memo-
randum of Understanding Regarding Application of National Antitrust Law: New Guide-
lines for Resolution of Multinational Antitrust Enforcement Disputes, 6 Nw J Intl L & Bus
1065, 1082-86 (1984-85); B. R. Campbell, The Canada-United States Antitrust Notification
and Consultation Procedure: A Study in Bilateral Conflict Resolution, 56 Canadian Bar
Rev 459, 460-63 (1978). See an earlier informal 1959 agreement, Joint Statement Concerning
Cooperation in Antitrust Matters issued by the Canadian Consumer and Corporate Affairs
Minister and the U.S. Attorney General, dated November 3, 1969, reproduced at 8 ILM
1305 (1969).
05 In the Australian agreement, every substantive article except Article 5, which deals
with cooperation, is devoted to the issue of conflict management.
The 1984 Canadian MOU lists two formal purposes in section 1: (1) the avoidance or
moderation of conflicts of interests and policies; and (2) closer cooperation in enforcement.
In light of the strains noted in the articles cited in note 64 above, the order in which these
are listed is no accident.
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The U.S.-EC Agreement of September 23, 1991, goes beyond
its predecessor agreements in a variety of ways.6 6 Rather than
growing out of the animosity created by conflicting claims to juris-
diction, it grows out of a consensus on both sides of the Atlantic
that "sound and effective enforcement of competition law is a mat-
ter of importance to the efficient operation" of both markets. 7
Resolution of differences is still an important purpose,68 but this
process is handled in a new, more positive way than was the case in
predecessor agreements. Article VI, devoted to Conflict Avoidance,
calls on the Parties to consider a list of six factors, in addition to
anything else that is appropriate, in seeking an appropriate
resolution:
1) the relative significance to the anticompetitive activi-
ties involved of conduct within the enforcing Party's ter-
ritory as compared to conduct within the other Party's
territory;
2) the presence or absence of a purpose on the part of
those engaged in the anticompetitive activities to affect
consumers, suppliers, or competitors within the enforcing
Party's territory;
3) the relative significance of the effects of the anticom-
petitive activities on the enforcing Party's interests as
compared to the effects on the other Party's interests;
4) the existence or absence of reasonable expectations
that would be furthered or defeated by the enforcement
activities;
5) the degree of conflict or consistency between the en-
forcement activities and the other Party's laws or articu-
lated economic policies; and
6) the extent to which enforcement activities of the other
Party with respect to the same persons, including judg-
6 For the full text, see 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg Rep (BNA) 382 (Sept 26, 1991) (re-
ferred to here as "U.S.-EC Agreement"). Although the agreement is presently in force, it
must be noted that on December 16, 1991, the French Government filed a challenge to it
with the ECJ, arguing that the Commission exceeded its authority in signing the agreement
with the U.S. antitrust agencies without receiving the approval of the EC Council of Minis-
ters, as the French argued was required pursuant to Article 228 of the Treaty of Rome. The
Commission's position is that the agreement merely implements Articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty, and is therefore not subject to the Article 228 procedure. See 62 Antitrust & Trade
Reg Rep (BNA) 45 (Jan 15, 1992).
67 U.S.-EC Agreement, Preamble, 3 (cited in note 66).
68 Id, V 5. See also Art II (Notification); Art VI (Avoidance of Conflicts over Enforce-
ment Activities), and Art VII (Consultation).
2771
296 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
ments or undertakings resulting from such activities, may
be affected. 9
Such a structured list of "positive comity" factors is unprece-
dented in an international understanding relating to competition
policy. 70 This much was possible only because of the significant
convergence, on the substantive level, between European law and
American law.
In addition, the cooperative provisions rest on the premise
that the two sets of competition laws, while obviously not identical,
are functionally equivalent. Article III.1 states that the "Parties
agree that it is in their common interest to share information that
will . . . facilitate effective application of their respective competi-
tion laws." Article IV.2 sets up a procedure for coordinating re-
lated enforcement actions. When anticompetitive actions occur
within the territory of one Party, while harming the interests of
the other, the injured Party may "request that . . . the competi-
tion authorities [of the Party where the action is occurring] initiate
appropriate enforcement activities."'1 In other words, if an Ameri-
can cartel is harming European interests, the Commission can ask
the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department to initiate a suit
against the cartel; or if a European cartel is harming American in-
terests, the U.S. can similarly approach the Commission. Although
the agreement carefully avoids mandating this type of reciprocal
enforcement activity, the mere establishment of such a procedure
represents a breakthrough in antitrust cooperation.
Yet, stepping back, the real story is still the modesty of the
agreement. The U.S.-EC Agreement is still a far cry from the more
ambitious proposals detailed by former Assistant Attorney General
Rill,7 or the recent proposals from the EC Competition Commis-
sioner, Sir Leon Brittan." One must ask the question why two
great entities-the EC and the U.S.-so similar in political out-
look, so similar in economic development, and so similar in atti-
6- Id, Art VI, 3.
70 The list is essentially the same as the one in the 1988 Department of Justice Anti-
trust Guidelines for International Operations, § 5 n 170. The commitment to consider them
is consistent with the position taken by the ALI's Restatement (Third) of the Law of For-
eign Relations of the United States § 403 (1987), except that the ALI indicates that consid-
eration of the comity factors is mandatory, and neither signatory would go that far.
7, U.S.-EC Agreement, Art IV.2.
71 See James Rill, Creating and Maintaining Competition in a Common Market: The
Future of Antitrust in an Integrated World Economy, 1992 U Chi Legal F 263, 270-75.
73 See Speech of Sir Leon Brittan (cited in note 21).
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tude toward competition policy, did not go further.7' The answer
can be found, in part, in the jurisdictional rules that still prevail
for public economic regulations such as antitrust law and, in part,
in the more subtle procedural and substantive differences that
have proven so difficult to overcome.
II. EXTRATERRITORIALITY: THE SUBSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT?
A. The Lex Americana Era
Competition law has never fallen within the fields of private
law that are enforceable across national lines, in the same way that
a U.S. court will not hesitate to honor a contractual provision
choosing English law as the law of a contract," or to apply
Cambodian law to a wrongful death claim." Instead, as Justice
Holmes assumed in American Banana Co. v United Fruit Co., an-
titrust legality originally depended upon "the law of the country
where the act is done. ' 77 Given the nature of multinational busi-
ness activity, however, the strict territoriality of American Banana
did not last long in the United States. 7 Instead, jurisdictional doc-
trines were quickly developed that brought within the scope of
U.S. antitrust law any actions taken abroad that had an anticom-
petitive effect within the United States.79 The best known of these
was the "intended effects" rule of United States v Aluminum Co.
"' The same question can be asked, incidentally, of the United States and Canada,
which are committed to resolving the problems of cross-border dumping and subsidies
within the context of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, reprinted at 27 ILM 281
(1988), but which have so far resisted the notion of opening up the borders and simply using
their respective competition laws for any problems that arise. See generally Conference, Ca-
nada-United States Free Trade Agreement: Implementation of Chapter 19, 17 Can-US L J
(1991); Ivan R. Feltham, Stuart A. Salen, Robert F. Mathieson, and Ronald Wonnacott,
Competition (Antitrust) and Antidumping Laws in the Context of the Canada-United
States Free Trade Agreement, 17 Can-US L J 71, 123-24, 158-59, 166 (1991).
75 The Bremen v Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 US 1, 12-14, 15 (1972).
76 Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v Chaloner, 423 US 3, 4-5 (1975).
77 213 US 347, 356 (1909).
78 See, for example, United States v Sisal Sales Corp., 274 US 268 (1927); United
States v American Tobacco Co:, 221 US 106 (1911); United States v Pacific & Arctic Ry.,
228 US 87 (1913); Thomsen v Cayser, 243 US 66 (1917). See generally James R. Atwood and
Kingman Brewster, Antitrust and American Business Abroad §§ 6.02-6.08, pp 142-56 (Mc-
Graw Hill, 2d ed 1981).
" From the point of view of public, international law, the decision in the case of the
S.S. "Lotus," 1927 Permanent Court of International Justice, ser E No 4 at 166, established
the proposition that international law did not prohibit states from asserting jurisdiction
when actions outside their jurisdiction had sufficiently direct effects within their authority.
The applicability of this principle to economic regulation, as opposed to the classic case of
the gunman firing a shot across the border, has been controversial. See, for example, the
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of America ("Alcoa"),80 under which conduct undertaken abroad
by foreign nationals was subject to the U.S. antitrust laws if it was
intended to affect U.S. markets, and actually had some effect.
After Alcoa, an era of aggressive extraterritorial enforcement
of U.S. antitrust law began. A number of factors probably account
for this: increasing global activity on the part of business enter-
prises; the economic and political dominance of the United States
during the first decades after World War II; the acceptance within
the United States of the theory of effects jurisdiction; and, of
course, the lack of any international machinery to address genuine
transnational competition problems. The U.S. government brought
sweeping cases in many industries: oil,81 titanium dioxide,82 inter-
national shipping,83 Swiss watchmaking," and many others.8 5 The
ability, for a time, to enforce antitrust standards through unilateral
action undoubtedly made the need for a multilateral code seem
less urgent to pro-antitrust forces in the U.S. Congress and admin-
istrations. But extraterritorial enforcement brought its own
problems, producing countermeasures of increasing strength on the
part of countries who resented this type of interference with their
own economic policies. 6
Initially, the opposition to extraterritorial enforcement actions
was grounded in both substantive and procedural concerns. With
the exception of Germany and Japan, which had U.S.-style anti-
record of diplomatic protest chronicled in Atwood & Brewster, Antitrust and American
Business Abroad § 4 (cited in note 78).
148 F2d 416 (2d Cir 1945).
8 See In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 FRD 280 (D DC 1952), as de-
scribed more fully in Atwood & Brewster, Antitrust and American Business Abroad at §
2.24 (cited in note 78).
"' United States v National Lead Co., 63 F Supp 513 (S D NY 1945), afild, 332 US 319
(1947).
88 In re Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping Industry, 186 F Supp 298 (D DC
1960).
8" United States v Watchmakers of Switzerland Info Center, 1963 Trade Cases (CCH)
70,600, judgment modified, 1965 Trade Cases (CCH) 71,352 (S D NY 1965).
" See generally Atwood & Brewster, Antitrust and American Business Abroad § 6, at
142-81, 1 2.23-2.24, at 41-47 (cited in note 78); Wilbur L. Fugate, 1 Foreign Commerce and
the Antitrust Laws T 2, vol II, 15 (Little, Brown & Co, 3d ed 1982); Barry E. Hawk, 1
United States, Common Market and International Antitrust: A Comparative Guide ch I,
B, 12-13, ch II, 114-17 (2d ed 1986).
"8 See, for example, British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd.,
1952:2 All England Law Reports 780; Uranium Information Security Regulations, Canada
Stat O&R 76-644 (Sept 21, 1976); [British] Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c 11.
The United States until recently took little account of the interests of foreign governments
when foreign law fell short of clear compulsion. Compare, Continental Ore Co. v Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 US 690 (1962); with Interamerican Refining Corp. v Texaco
Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F Supp 1291 (D Del 1970).
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trust laws imposed upon them by U.S. occupation forces, 7 and Ca-
nada, which ,had a largely unenforced competition law on its
books," the rest of the world had not yet "gotten religion" on this
point. Over time, the substantive picture changed. Most impor-
tantly, when the original Six Member States created the Common
Market in 1958, they became -committed in principle to competi-
tion rules that were quite similar to those in the United States. 9
The adoption in 1962 of Regulation 17, which created most of the
machinery for the enforcement of Articles 85 and 86, set in motion
the development of antitrust law pursuant to these articles.90
Even with substantive convergence, objections to extraterrito-
rial enforcement, based on procedural grounds, continued. Inter-
estingly, however, the remaining problems in this area tended to
arise from private litigation in the United States, rather than gov-
ernment litigation. Examples here include the uranium cartel
suit,91 the Laker case (over the failure of Freddie Laker's discount
trans-Atlantic air service),92 and the recent insurance litigation. 3
The bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements or memoranda of
understanding with Canada, Australia, and Germany that were dis-
cussed earlier contributed substantially toward eliminating the in-
tergovernmental tensions of the earlier era, but they studiously
avoided any concessions on jurisdictional theory. In addition, two
efforts to clarify the reach of U.S. law had the effect of communi-
87 Fugate, 2 Foreign Commerce and the Antitrust Laws at 394-95 (cited in note 85)
(Japan); Kurt Stockmann and Volkmar Strauch, Federal Republic of Germany § 1.03(1),
(2), in von Kalinowski, B5 World Law of Competition (cited in note 3).
" An Act for the Prevention and Suppression of Combinations formed in Restraint of
Trade, S C 1889, c 41 was incorporated into the Criminal Code in 1892, where the provisions
remained until 1960. At that time, this law was consolidated with the Combines Investiga-
tion Act, R S, c C-23, which was later amended by: c 10 (1st Supp); c 10 (2d Supp), 1974-75-
76, c 76; 1976-77, c 28; 1985, c 19; 1986, c 26.
89 See note 21 and sources cited therein.
*o Council Reg 17/62, 1962 OJ 204, later amended by Council Reg 59/62, 1962 OJ 1655,
Council Reg 118/63, 1963 OJ 2696, and Council Reg 2822/71, 1971 OJ L285:49.
91 For three nations' perspectives on the uranium case, see, for example, In re Uranium
Antitrust Litigation, 617 F2d 1248 (7th Cir 1980); Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v Westinghouse
Electric Corp., 1978:1 All England Law Reports 434 (House of Lords, 1977), 1978:2 WLR 81;
Gulf Oil Corp. v Gulf Canada Ltd., 1980-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 63, 285 (Can S Ct 1980).
See also Fugate, Foreign Commerce and the Antitrust Laws at 2.16, at 94-97 (cited in note
85); Hawk, Antitrust: A Comparative Guide at 549-53 (cited in note 85).
9 Laker Airways Ltd. v Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F2d 908 (DC Cir 1984).
Compare British Airways Board v Laker Airways Ltd., 1984:3 All England Law Reports 39
(House of Lords).
" See In re Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 938 F2d 919 (9th Cir 1991), petitions for
cert granted sub nom Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v California, No 91-1111, Merrett Underwrit-
ing Agency Management Ltd. v California, No 91-1128, Winterthur Reinsurance Corp. v
California, No 91-1131, Unionamerica Ins. Co. v California, No 91-1146, 113 S Ct 52 (1992).
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cating a more moderate position to the rest of the world: the 1982
amendments to the antitrust 'laws that restricted jurisdiction in
non-import cases to instances where a "direct, substantial, and rea-
sonably foreseeable" effect could be found;"4 and the development
of a comity-based balancing test by many courts of appeal, under
which cases could be dismissed if the U.S. interest was deemed
insufficient. 5
Furthermore, outside the EC, North America, and Australia,
competition law principles and enforcement practices continued to
vary widely from country to country. Some feared that this left
powerful multinational firms essentially unregulated;96 others,
speaking for those firms, claimed that it left them in an impossible
situation, commanded or encouraged by one sovereign to take one
action, and forbidden by another to pursue the identical conduct. 7
In addition, the developing countries became aware that restrictive
business practices could harm their economies, yet they felt unable
unilaterally to regulate multinational practices. Their response, as
noted above, was to stress the importance of the UNCTAD Re-
strictive Business Practices Code, but the Code's practical effects
have been minimal.
B. If You Can't Beat Them, Join Them
Gradually, as the EC became more powerful economically and
as extraterritorial theory itself became more refined, extraterritori-
ality began to be accepted within the Community. The Commis-
sion argued in the 1972 Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. v Com-
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982, 15 USC § 6a.
" Timberlane Lumber Co. v Bank of America, 549 F2d 597 (9th Cir 1976)
("Timberlane I"); Timberlane Lumber Co. v Bank of America, 574 F Supp 1453 (N D Cal
1983) ("Timberlane II"); Timberlane Lumber Co. v Bank of America, 749 F2d 1378 (9th Cir
1984), cert denied, 472 US 1032 (1985). See also Mannington Mills, Inc. v Congoleum Corp.,
595 F2d 1287 (3d Cir 1979), for an alternative formulation of the balancing test.
9' Cynthia Day Wallace wrote an entire book examining the ways in which multination-
als are and are not effectively regulated. See Cynthia Day Wallace, Legal Control of the
Multinational Enterprise (Martinus Nighoff, 1983), where she notes that "we must confront
the issue of whether the [multinational enterprise] is at present subject to any form of con-
trol, or whether, as is popularly alleged, it runs rough-shod, unfettered and uncontrolled
across national boundaries, with no heed to national jurisdictions and no answerability to
higher authority." Id at xvii.
97 See, for example, the commentary on the foreign sovereign compulsion defense con-
tained in the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law and Section of Interna-
tional Trade and Practice, Report to the House of Delegates on the Draft U.S. Department
of Justice Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations, 57 Antitrust L J 651, 664-68
(1988) (noting in particular that a defense was appropriate when a firm took certain actions
under the equivalent of duress imposed by the foreign government).
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mission ("ICI-Dyestuffs"), that the Community could assert
jurisdiction over conduct undertaken in non-Member States, if
that conduct had harmful effects within the Community. The
ECJ adopted a more cautious approach and instead found, first,
that the agreements to increase prices had been implemented
within the Community and, second, that the companies' subsidiar-
ies within the Common Market carried out the instructions of the
parent firms. 9 In the 1988 decision in Re Wood Pulp Cartel: A
AhIstrom Oy v Commission, the ECJ took another step toward rec-
ognition of a general effects theory, when it decided to hold the
members of a foreign-based export cartel, whose products were
sold within the Community, subject to EC law.100 The sales into
the Community provided the necessary link to EC territory, or
more generally validated the EC's regulatory interest in the foreign
conduct. With the exception of the rare case, such as one in which
foreigners were refusing to deal with EC customers, in which the,
Wood Pulp rule indicates that no jurisdiction would exist, the
reach of European law is now almost coexistent with its U.S.
counterpart.0 1
C. The New Conflicts
Consensus on the proposition that national boundaries are of
little if any relevance to the anticompetitive behavior of multina-
tional enterprises has led to increasing international support for
national jurisdiction that reaches extraterritorial actions with suffi-
ciently important internal effects. Ironically; however, agreement
on extraterritorial jurisdiction has given birth to a new set of
problems, which are pushing us back toward the model of interna-
tional agreements on competition. As long as most countries con-
fined the application of their rules to conduct within their own ter-
ritories, enterprises could determine with a fair degree of certainty
what conduct was permissible and what was not, building into that
See Dyestuffs Cartel, Commission Order of July 24, 1969, 1969 OJ L195:11, 1969
CMLR D23.
o Case 48/69, Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. v Commission ("ICI-Dyestuffs"),
1972 ECR 619, 661-63, 1972 CMLR 557, 629.
100 Cases 89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116/85, 117/85, 125/85, 126/85, 127/85, 128/85, 129/85,
Re Wood Pulp Cartel: A Ahlstrom Oy v EC Commission, 1988 ECR 5193, 5242-5243, 1988:4
CMLR 901.
101 The recent announcement by the U.S. Department of Justice that foreign-based car-
tels that were refusing to purchase from U.S. exporters might also be challenged.by Ameri-
can authorities represents another area of jurisdictional dispute. See Speech of Sir Leon
Brittan, at 16-17 (cited in note 21).
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determination the risk that a private suit might also be brought in
the U.S. The triumph of effects jurisdiction, in contrast, has multi-
plied several times over the number of different jurisdictions in
which regulatory claims must be satisfied.
Merger law provides the best example of the brave new world.
Major mergers and acquisitions involving firms with plants or sub-
sidiaries in Canada, the United States, and the EC, must now no-
tify their plans to each jurisdiction, according to the timetable set
out by each, furnishing the substantive information required by
each. The administrative burdens are significant. 10 2 Worse, the
substantive standards are not entirely harmonious. The Commu-
nity may wish to permit a merger, while either Canada or the
United States may wish to enjoin it. If the transaction falls below
the value thresholds necessary for Community jurisdiction,03 the
overlapping jurisdictions may include many of the Member States
of the Community, as well as the North American countries. When
the possibility of private litigation intervening in the United States
is added to the picture, it is clear that new mechanisms for coordi-
nating merger enforcement are essential.0 4 The great irony in all
of this is that the greater acceptance of extraterritorial jurisdiction
theories has created a need for international agreements: precisely
102 See 1991 Special Committee Report at ch 7 (cited in note 36); James T. Halverson,
Harmonization and Coordination of International Merger Procedures, 60 Antitrust L J 531
(1991).
103 The Merger Regulation, Council Reg 4064/89, 1990 OJ L257:14, establishes several
thresholds for the necessary "Community dimension." These require that the firms involved
have a combined aggregate worldwide turnover of more than 5 billion ECU (approximately
U.S. $6.2 billion) and that the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of
the firms involved is more than 250 million ECU (approximately U.S. $300 million), unless
in the latter case each of the firms involved achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate
Community turnover in one and the same Member State. See id, art 1(2), 1990 OJ at
L257:16. There are various exceptions to these general rules, including the so-called German
clause of article 9, which allows the Commission to refer a Community-dimension merger to
a Member State in which a distinct market is particularly affected; the exception for legiti-
mate national interests such as public security, plurality of the media, and prudential rules
noted inarticle 21(3); and the exception of article 22(3), allowing a Member State to refer a
concentration falling below the Community thresholds to the Commission for appropriate
action.
104 Examples of such overlaps are multiplying daily. They include Consolidated Gold
Fields PLC v Minorco, S.A., 871 F2d 252 (2d Cir 1983), cert dismissed, 110 S Ct 29 (1989)
(reviewed by the U.S., the United Kingdom, Australia, and the EC); the Cillette/Wilkinson
acquisition, reviewed from Europe to North American to Australia; and the acquisition by
Sara Lee Corp. of Playtex Apparel, Inc., reviewed by the United States, Italy, and Canada.
The problem of coordination with private litigation in the United States is a serious one,
particularly after the decision in California v American Stores Co., 110 S Ct 1853 (1990),
established the rule that private parties in the U.S. and state attorneys general are entitled
to obtain divestiture or other forms of injunctive relief against mergers.
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the mechanism that the greatest opponents of extraterritoriality
urged was the only legitimate one for handling transnational
problems. 10 5
III. BARRIERS TO AGREEMENT; COSTS OF INACTION
Unilateral action has proven incapable of providing a satisfac-
tory regulatory regime for international competition problems, and
it is clear that the degree of economic (and now political) unifica-
tion that the EC countries have chosen internally is not the way
the EC, the U.S., and Canada together will solve their coordination
problems.1 0 6 The questions at hand are whether the barriers to ef-
fective international agreements-short of EC-style integra-
tion-are simply too great for resolution, and what will be the
likely price of lack of agreement.
A. Substantive Barriers to International Agreement
Substantive disagreements in the letter of the law among the
EC, the United States, and Canada, continue to impede greater
international cooperation, but it would be a mistake to assume
that they form an insurmountable barrier. In the grand scheme of
things, whether from an historical, comparative, or philosophical
viewpoint, the similarities are far more striking.1 07 More than that,
'05 Douglas E. Rosenthal and William M. Knighton, National Laws and International
Commerce 40, 90-91 (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982).
100 The balance of the article confines the discussion of harmonization or agreement
possibilities among the U.S, EC, and Canada.
10I So much has been written about all three bodies of law that it would be difficult to
do each one justice. Hawk, United States, Common Market and International Antitrust: A
Comparative Guide (cited in note 85), both describes EC law in detail and offers useful
comparisons to U.S. law throughout. See also Goyder, EC Competition Law (cited in note
21); Ritter, Rawlinson, & Braun, Practitioner's Guide (cited in note 21), on EC competition
law.
A description of the Competition Act of 1986 (Canada) can be found in von Kalinowski,
A3 World Law of Competition (rel 36-5/87) (cited in note 3). See also Calvin S. Goldman,
The New Merger Provisions of the Competition Act of Canada, in Barry E. Hawk, ed,
North American and Common Market Antitrust and Trade Laws: Annual Proceedings of
the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 119 (Matthew Bender, 1988); J. William Rowley, The
New Canada Antitrust Laws: Reflections from the Private Sector, in Hawk, ed, North
American and Common Market Antitrust and Trade Laws: Annual Proceedings of the
Fordham Corporate Law Institute at 157; Ivan R. Feltham, The New Canadian Antitrust
Law, in Hawk, ed, North American and Common Market Antitrust and Trade Laws: An-
nual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute at 225. With respect to U.S. law,
a convenient one-volume treatment of the area is Herbert Hovenkamp, Economics and Fed-
eral Antitrust Law (West Publishing, 1985). The leading treatise is Phillip Areeda and Don-
ald F. Turner, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application
(Little, Brown & Co, 1978).
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the priorities or ranking of competition issues, from most impor-
tant to least, looks much the same across the three jurisdictions:
cartels of all kinds top the list; the need to regulate mergers from a
competitive standpoint is a close second (and is related in any
event to the cartel issue); and abuses of dominant firm behavior
comes next (the higher the firm's market power, the higher the
level of consensus). The differences include disagreements about
the proper treatment of unfair or anticompetitive behavior that
does not immediately affect price or output levels, the appropriate
regime for vertical restrictions, and the way in which competition
policy relates to broader national economic goals.
1. Purposes of competition law.
To a small (and perhaps shrinking) degree, the three bodies of
law differ with respect to the purposes they acknowledge. In the
United States, the purposes of antitrust law are still a subject of
debate, since the governing legislation is limited to statements of
general principle, and the purpose at this point must be discerned
from the accumulated case law.108 In Canada, the purposes are ex-
plicitly set forth in Section 1 of the Competition Act; they include
the promotion of efficiency, protection of small and medium-sized
businesses, and consumer welfare. 109 In the EC, the original reason
for the inclusion of competition policy may well have been the
need to prevent private restraints that had the effect of dividing
national markets from replacing public tariffs and quotas. 10 At
this point, however, the Community relies just as much on the gen-
eral benefits of a competitive market for consumer welfare, busi-
ness efficiency, and fair access to the market."'
In general, the purposes of a competition law may include
some or all of the following: allocative efficiency, fair business prac-
tices, eliminating exclusionary practices, avoidance of private bar-
riers to trade across a geographical region, access to the market,
and enhancing domestic welfare. The factor that separates the
I08 Compare Eleanor M. Fox and Laurence A. Sullivan, Cases and Materials on Anti-
trust 2-3, 10-11, 845-51 (West Publishing, 1989); Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of
Antitrust, 127 U Pa L Rev 1051 (1979); with Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Eco-
nomic Perspective 3-4, 8-35 (U of Chicago Press, 1976); Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust
Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 7-8, 50-89 (Basic Books, 1978); Frank H. Easterbrook,
The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex L Rev 1 (1984).
,00 See Competition Act R S, c C-23, s 1.1; 1986, c 26, s 19.
"10 See note 21.
. See Twelfth Report on Competition Policy, cited in Ritter, Rawlinson, & Braun,
Practitioner's Guide (cited in note 21).
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competition purists from the others is the question whether com-
petition is a national goal for its own sake, or, on the other hand,
whether it is simply a part of a more general industrial policy re-
gime. Should competition yield, for example, when a merger that
clearly will raise prices for consumers will also save jobs in a par-
ticular region? Should it yield when an export cartel that obviously
harms worldwide consumer welfare holds some promise of improv-
ing trade balances? Even if one assumes that the answer to those
questions in the United States favors competition in all instances
(which is far from clear),112 the debate is even more immediate in
Europe and Canada.11
2. What is actually anticompetitive?
Some states have a very narrow definition of a "restraint of
trade" or an "anticompetitive practice," including on ly practices
that would create economic market power or, in other words, en-
able a firm to influence price by restricting output under circum-
stances where the positive benefits would not outweigh the welfare
losses.1"4 A somewhat broader definition would condemn all ar-
rangements or practices that enhanced or supported market power,
whether or not any efficiencies were created at the same time.
Many, however, consider antitrust or competition law to be a body
of law that assures equal access to the market for competitors and
that, therefore, condemns anticompetitve behavior such as preda-
tory pricing, refusals to deal, refusal to permit access to an essen-
tial facility, and any other practice that may penalize a firm that is
just as efficient as the predator. The scope of antitrust policy is,
finally, a political decision, and no country actually practices the
purest version. If one jurisdiction bans something and another
thinks it represents good hard competition, agreement will be
difficult.
,' See, for example, recent calls for a national industrial policy, such as that of Rep.
Norman Mineta. Government Should Aid High-Tech Industry, Rep. Mineta States, Intl
Trade Daily (BNA) (May 7, 1992); see also Reich, The Next American Frontier (cited in
note 4), and Robert B. Reich, The Work of Nations (A.A. Knopf, 1991).
.. See Canadian Competition Act 1986, Art 32(4), which exempts export associations
from the cartel offense. Note also that clause 13 of the preamble to the EC's Merger Regula-
tion calls on the Commission to implement the Regulation "within the general framework of
the achievement of the fundamental objectives referred to in Article 2 of the Treaty, includ-
ing that of strengthening the Community's economic and social cohesion, referred to in Arti-
cle 130a." Council Reg 4064/89, 1990 OJ L257:14.
"' This concept of economic efficiency requires the antitrust enforcer not only to detect
market power, but also to offset any resource efficiency gains that the firm with market
power may be able to effect.
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B. Procedural Barriers
Procedural variations are more significant for two reasons:
first, the differences among regions are far more notable; and sec-
ond, the procedural differences translate into different enforce-
ment patterns. A country's commitment to a particular law is, in
the end, only as good as the procedural mechanisms available to
enforce that law-this is, after all, the place where a country puts
its money where its mouth is. " " In the final analysis, procedural
differences reveal actual substantive preferences, since compliance
is more likely a function of credible enforcement than of words in a
statute or treaty.
1. Enforcement mechanisms.
On the U.S. side, there are numerous enforcers, including the
Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, the state
attorneys general, and private parties, which effectively leaves pol-
icy-making up to the courts, with an occasional intervention from
Congress. " ' In the courts, procedures such as the liberality of the
notice pleading system," 7 pre-trial discovery,118 occasionally class
actions, " and the broad injunctive power enjoyed by federal
judges, are strange and offensive to outsiders. On top of that, the
separation of powers doctrine in the United States that insulates
the federal judiciary makes antitrust policy far more difficult to
change in a political sense than one finds on the European or Ca-
nadian side. In Europe, for example, the Commission's central role
creates an entirely different political dynamic. 120 Whether govern-
"' In this connection, one might recall the dismal human rights record of the former
Soviet Union, in spite of the existence in the Brezhnev Constitution of 1977 of an impres-
sive-looking list of individual rights. More modestly, the same point holds for antitrust law.
"' See generally Areeda & Turner, 2 Antitrust Law 308-13, 331-32, 343 (cited in
note 107).
"7 See FRCP 8. Note here that most antitrust enforcement continues to take place in
the federal courts, where these rules prevail, even though many states have their own local
antitrust laws. In the latter cases, one should note that most states have some version of
notice pleading also, even those that nominally still consider themselves to be code states,
such as California, Illinois, and New York.
.. See FRCP 26-37.
"' See FRCP 23. The existence of the rule of Illinois Brick Co. v Illinois, 431 US 720
(1977), which bars most suits by indirect purchasers, has contributed to a decline in the
number of consumer class actions. See, for example, Stephen D. Susman and John B. McAr-
thur, If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It, 55 Antitrust L J 59, 62-63. See also the Georgetown
Law Center, Conference on Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 Georgetown L J (1986), which
reported on a comprehensive study of private antitrust enforcement.
2 See Francis G. Jacobs, Europe After 1992: The Legal Challenge, 1992 U Chi Legal F
1, 4-7.
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ment monopoly over policy and enforcement is a good thing or a
bad thing is certainly debatable. The fact that these responsibili-
ties differ, however, causes distrust on both sides, which in turn
compromises genuine antitrust harmonization.,
2. Remedies.
The remedial structures in the different jurisdictions also dif-
fer significantly. The same offense that actually may cause criminal
prosecution in the United States poses somewhat less risk of the
same in Canada, and no risk at all in the EC. 121 The government
may not seek civil penalties in the United States, but the Commis-
sion may do so in Europe.122 On the other hand, only the United
States permits private treble damage actions, private requests for
injunctions, and private access to the divestiture remedy in merger
cases. 1 3 Due to these procedural differences, both the risk of being
accused of an anticompetitive practice and the expected penalty
will differ substantially, and, hence, so too will the importance of
competition law as a primary rule regulating industry behavior.
3. Antitrust and fundamental economic policy.
In the final analysis, the reason individual nations have thus
far insisted on autonomy over their competition law policy rests in
the complex interrelationship between competition law and other
national economic goals, such as technological development, full
employment, respect for the sovereignty of inferior political units
(that is, the states in the U.S., the provinces in Canada, the Mem-
ber States of the EC), and international trade balances. If a coun-
try has autonomy over its competition policy, it has de facto power
to make exceptions to even the strictest rule. International ac-
countability, or subordination to an international body, would
compromise that ability. No society is unequivocally committed to
121 Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 USC §§ 1, 2, make collusive anticompetitive
behavior ("contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade") and monopoliza-
tion felonies. The government vigorously prosecutes hard-core price-fixing and bid-rigging
under these statutes. See Areeda & Turner, 2 Antitrust Law at 309 (cited in note 107).
Although the 1986 Canadian Competition Act retains criminal provisions for certain of-
fenses (see Part V, §§ 32-39), it is fair to say that the emphasis in Canadian enforcement
shifted from the criminal sphere (under which little activity had taken place) to the civil
sphere. In the EC, of course, Articles 85 and 86, as well as the Merger Regulation, are purely
administrative.
122 See Council Reg 17/62, arts 15, 16, 1962 OJ 204, as amended by Council Reg 59/62,
1962 OJ 1655, Council Reg 118/63, 1963 OJ 2696, and Council Reg 2822, 1971 OJ L285:49;
and the Merger Regulation, Council Reg 4064/89, arts 14, 15, 1990 OJ at L257:22-23.
..3 See sources cited in note 107.
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antitrust policy, and the power to choose when an exemption will
or will not exist is the essence of economic sovereignty. Once again,
the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations provides the best com-
parison. The same basic problems of economic sovereignty are
stalling these negotiations on issues such as agricultural subsidies,
protection of industry, and intellectual property protection. Few
countries would be willing to cede these basic decisions to a supe-
rior organization, without some assurance that their interests
would be fully respected.
C. What Is the Cost of Failure?
Having noted the important obstacles to international agree-
ment, the fact remains that some kind of agreement would be
helpful and that the costs of failing to agree will be high now, and
higher over time. Those costs fall into three general categories.
1. Transaction costs.
To the extent that firms conduct business in several jurisdic-
tions (a circumstance that is common now, and likely to increase),
the existence of conflicting rules gives rise to substantial transac-
tion costs. On a day-to-day basis, firms must monitor multiple
rules and devise structures to comply with all of them, even when
serious inconsistencies exist. In the case of mergers, companies
must deal with multiple pre-merger clearance procedures simulta-
neously, filling out differing forms, adhering to different timeta-
bles, and adjusting to the different nuances of substantive review.
Occasionally, firms may find themselves in the unenviable po-
sition addressed by the foreign sovereign compulsion defense: com-
manded by one country to take a certain action, forbidden by an-
other to do the same thing. Withdrawal from one of the markets is
not likely to be an efficient solution for either the firm or the con-
sumers involved. Yet the broad acceptance of the effects theory of
jurisdiction means that there is no simple solution such as the de-
vice of giving jurisdictional primacy to only one of the countries.
To the extent that slight differences in law and procedure produce
substantial private dislocations, the transaction costs may be out
of proportion to the gain either side expects.
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2. Global inefficiency costs.
To the extent that thexe is a "correct" rule for competition
policy-such as the anti-cartel rule 124-the existence of exceptions
to this rule will cause the classic social deadweight losses that each
country is individually committed to eliminating. Even if one na-
tion is temporarily better off because it has found a way to extract
monopoly rents from its neighbors, globally this is an impoverish-
ing solution.
3. Trade distortions.
What happens when one country allows cartels and another
does not? The U.S. courts faced this issue in the Japanese elec-
tronic products litigation, where the U.S. industry claimed that the
high cartel profits from the protected Japanese market were being
used to subsidize a broad-based attack on the U.S. industry.125
Without engaging in the unlikely assumption that the Japanese
were voluntarily losing money in 'the U.S. for a period of twenty
years, one might think that the trade patterns that would have
prevailed in the absence of a hypothesized Japanese cartel would
have been different than those that were actually observed and
that greater competition might have allowed some efficient U.S.
firms to survive.12 Although individual countries might see some
advantage in such conduct, over the long run, everyone is better off
without this kind of trade distortion.
IV. THE NEXT PHASE
Bluntly speaking' the question for the future is whether the
developed countries can afford to leave competition law in its pre-
sent condition-unilaterally determined and enforced, with the oc-
casional bilateral treaty formalizing interactions between enforce-
ment agencies-or whether something more is desirable, if not
Nearly every state or organization with a competition law at all subscribes to the
anti-cartel rule. See 1991 Special Committee Report at ch 2 (cited in note 36).
... See Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v Zenith Radio Corp., 475 US 574 (1986).
126 Note that this is a different point from the question whether U.S. consumers were
hurt over the short run by the Japanese firms' practices. If the Japanese firms were exploit-
ing Japanese consumers, or the Japanese taxpayer, in order to charge lower prices in the
United States, then U.S. consumers suffered no immediate injury-they bought bargain
T.V. sets. However, a strict economic approach disapproves of resource misallocations
brought about by artificially low prices (that is, too many resources devoted to buying this
product) just as it disapproves of misallocations bought about by artificially high prices
(that is, too few units of the product demanded). "Artificial" in this context means a result
brought about by market power on either the buying or selling side, as opposed to transac-
tions driven solely by market constraints.
277]
310 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
essential. Specifically, will agreements like the U.S.-EC bilateral be
enough, or should it be regarded as the first step toward something
more ambitious? In spite of the existing differences in viewpoint
and the difficulties of overcoming them, the answer seems plain.
Over the long run, the costs of the "no international antitrust" so-
lution (at least among the major economic players) will become
prohibitively high. Although nothing like the European solution
will be achievable on a broader multilateral scale any time soon,
serious cooperation, convergence, and ultimately harmonization are
possible if efforts are carefully targeted both to the needs of the
international system and to the obstacles identified here. Such a
regime would move international antitrust as far forward as it
needs to go at the present time, while respecting the inappropriate-
ness of more ambitious steps in the light of existing political
institutions.
A. Accuracy of Decisionmaking
The first set of concerns one can discern from the remaining
differences among countries relate to the accuracy of decisionmak-
ing: has the court, or the commission, or the agency, accurately
identified a practice that is anticompetitive? Accuracy concerns are
amenable to procedural solutions. In particular, enforcement agen-
cies (following the direction of the U.S.-EC Agreement) could im-
prove their information-sharing abilities, seek necessary amend-
ments to national confidentiality rules permitting counterpart
agencies to be treated the same as the home agency, and create
access to court and administrative proceedings for counterpart
agencies equivalent to the access rights given other favored parties
(such as the Member States within the EC, or the U.S. Attorney
General in the United States).
The existence of private suits in the United States would con-
tinue to be problematic since only the courts control the final out-
come in actual litigation, and since the private attorney-general is
here to stay. On the other hand, if a limited restriction of the pri-
vate suit were presented as the quid pro quo for the elimination of
troublesome jurisdictional conflicts for U.S. firms overseas, an
agreement addressing the issue of private litigation might not be
impossible. For example, in keeping with present trends, one can
imagine restricting damages for notified joint ventures and mergers
to single damages, providing for loser-pays attorneys fees, and re-
stricting private access to injunctions to circumstances that were
not before the FTC or the Department of Justice in the Hart-
Scott-Rodino filings. Such measures would add predictability to
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U.S. enforcement, while at the same time preserving private suits
for core antitrust violations and for egregious circumstances. Fi-
nally, more detailed choice of law rules, pursuant to which one
agency would be assigned the lead role, can contribute to both ac-
curacy and efficiency. Such rules could assure primacy for the
country or region with the greatest interest in the transaction and,
hence, the greatest expertise in the application of the proper rules.
B. Penalty Levels
Penalty levels, as noted above, also vary from place to place
and, thus, pose an impediment to agreement. These concerns are
not easily overcome, since the level of penalty is directly related to
the broader social decision about the role of competition law in
national economic policy. To the extent that a country has adopted
criminal penalties to achieve optimal deterrence, however, it could
recognize the appropriate level of fines as achieving the same goal.
In the penalty area, as in others, an agreement may be possible
once the ultimate reason for the chosen penalty is articulated
clearly. Mutual recognition might work within certain thresholds
and for certain areas, such as mergers, joint. ventures, and cartels.
Other areas (abuse offenses, in particular) might require more for-
mal harmonization, which would need to be accomplished through
national laws.
C. Prosecutorial Discretion
The third general issue relates to another hallmark of sover-
eignty, prosecutorial discretion. The choice of cases to prosecute,
as well as the choice of persons empowered to make this decision,
is simply an indirect substantive decision. To the extent that effec-
tive political oversight of the prosecutors exists, enforcement deci-
sions can create de facto exemptions to the competition laws, as
well as relatively safe (or risky) areas. Any effective international
agreement would diminish this kind of discretion. If information-
sharing were sought in the case of a nominally illegal agreement
that suited political industrial policy goals, facilitating the other
country's enforcement efforts would compromise those goals. It
would become more difficult to wink at agreements that may cause
harm only to foreign consumers, such as rent-seeking export ar-
rangements that exploit the other signatory or signatories.
In the final analysis, this may be another area where the best
should not be the enemy of the good. Rather than attempt to pre-
vent nations from exercising these kinds of judgments altogether,
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it may be preferable to permit national interest exceptions under
closely monitored circumstances. Something like the escape clause
of Article XIX of the GATT may offer a useful model. When some
kind of threshold national interest is proven, a country could in-
voke the escape mechanism and avoid its international enforce-
ment obligations. The mechanism could be limited by time, by re-
gion of the country, or by other statutory mandates, such as
restrictions related to the international trade laws. In a world of
first-best, nothing like this would be desirable, but in the real
world, there must be some way to respond to the economic sover-
eignty-based need to create exceptions while at the same time per-
mitting international antitrust rules to operate for the vast major-
ity of cases.
D. Institutional Support
Last, an effective agreement must have credible institutional
support. The machinery for dispute resolution, for advisory opin-
ions, and for monitoring compliance, will play a critical role in the
success of the arrangement. To take a counterexample, it is notable
that the reason why the ECJ rejected the first draft of the agree-
ment for the European Economic Area was largely because of insti-
tutional concerns about the hybrid court that the EEA would have
created. 127 The machinery created by the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement under Articles 18 and 19 provides an intriguing prece-
dent for this problem: dispute resolution that is institutionalized in
the agreement, with the agreement itself as a partial source of law,
but which ultimately relies on the national laws of the signatory
parties. 128 An agreement with machinery that draws on these alter-
native models could furnish a more ambitious degree of coordina-
tion than the present bilaterals and would be more responsive to
the needs of international business and the shrinking world in the
twenty-first century, while, at the same time, it would not require
'2 See Court rules against EEA treaty, Common Mkt Rptr (CCH) 96,198. The final
solution, which was approved by the ECJ on April 11, 1992, makes it clear that the ECJ is
the dominant legal body. The treaty now creates a political committee to handle disputes
arising from the treaty, making the ECJ supreme in all antitrust matters involving either
the EC or both the EC and EFTA areas, and creating an EFTA Court for purely EFTA
problems. See EC Court of Justice Rules in Favor of European Economic Area, Intl Trade
Daily (BNA) (Apr 14, 1992).
128 See Conference, Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 17 Can-US L J
(cited in note 74), on the law and economics of dispute resolution between Canada and the
United States. See in particular Jean Anderson and Jonathan T. Fried, The Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement in Operation, 17 Can-US L J 397 (1991).
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closer economic integration than the political will in all countries
concerned would support.
CONCLUSION
Despite the failures of the immediate post-World War II
policymakers to craft a successful international antitrust policy,
their basic instincts were correct. The benefits of international
trade and the global prosperity that all nations seek will be
stymied without a broad international commitment to the ground
rules for competition. It is probably best not to impose this task on
the already overworked GATT, given the disparities in develop-
ment, economic system, and experience with competition law that
exist across the GATT's broad membership."5 9 A modest begin-
ning, such as a trilateral agreement among Canada, the European
Community, and the United States, would have the benefits of
building on a sophisticated competition law tradition in each coun-
try, relying on a reciprocal enforcement system rather than un-
known international machinery, and allowing experimentation with
a framework that ultimately could expand to include all nations
willing to trust the market. International antitrust, in the end, will
only be as impossible as national protectionist forces make it.
,19 I do not necessarily disagree with Sir Leon's suggestion that the GATT or a similar
organization might not ultimately be a good place for this function. See Speech of Sir Leon
Brittan (cited in note 21); Speech to World Economic Forum (Feb 3, 1992), reported in
Common Mkt Rptr # 700, at 11-12 (Feb 20, 1992). However, it seems better to try walking
before we begin sprinting or running in this area.
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